A Fruit-Fly Connectome, Online Simulations and Questions About Experience

要約

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In this September 2026 short, Matthew Berman describes a newly mapped fruit-fly nervous system, shows virtual flies performing human-like activities and asks whether a fully simulated animal would be real or could suffer. Those are philosophical and scientific questions, not conclusions established by the clips. Google Research, HHMI Janelia and collaborators published a male fruit-fly brain and central-nervous-system connectome. It is a map of anatomical connections, not a complete physiological reproduction; demonstrations may add software-defined inputs, outputs and controls.

1A mapped nervous systemThe 2026 male fly map was produced by a collaboration, not Google alone. A connectome records neural connections rather than a fully functioning animal.
2Online demonstrationsBerman shows animated flies in games and human activities; the video does not establish their biological fidelity or control methods.
3The ethical questionBerman asks whether future full simulations could be real or suffer. Neither consciousness nor suffering is demonstrated by these clips.

ポイント

The 2026 male fruit-fly connectome is a collaborative anatomical map involving Google Research, HHMI Janelia and other researchers.
A wiring diagram alone does not reproduce every biological state, sensory process or behavior of a living fly.
Virtual blackjack, driving and other clips are demonstrations; the video does not verify how each is controlled or whether it reproduces real fly behavior.
Whether any particular simulation could have subjective experience or suffer remains an open question.

トピックNeuroscience & AI Consciousness Simulation Hypothesis

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A fly map and simulated behavior

Berman introduces a fruit-fly connectome and shows a montage of virtual-fly activities. A map and a simulation are different objects, and each demo requires its own validation.

スライド 1 / 2Fruit-fly nervous-system mapThe visual depicts a neural map; an anatomical connectome alone is not a complete living brain simulation.

スライド 2 / 2A virtual fly at a blackjack tableThe scene is a software demonstration and does not establish human-like understanding or subjective experience.

Matthew Berman shows virtual fruit flies in playful online demonstrations and connects them to a newly mapped nervous system. In September 2026, [Google Research described a collaboration with HHMI Janelia, researchers in Cambridge and others](https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/research/male-fruit-fly-brain-map/) mapping the brain and central nervous system of an adult male fruit fly, with more than 166,000 neurons. It is a collaborative connectome, not work by Google alone.

A connectome is an anatomical wiring map of neurons and their connections. It does not by itself specify every neuron’s physiology, the animal’s body and environment, or a complete reproduction of its behavior. The male nervous-system map discussed here is distinct from the earlier [FlyWire adult female brain connectome](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-024-07968-y); a simulation using one should not automatically be described as using the other.

Berman’s montage depicts flies playing blackjack, smoking a hookah, cutting a kebab, driving, solving a Rubik’s Cube and playing a video game. These are virtual scenes, not evidence that a biological fruit fly can perform those human tasks. Implementations can use developer-designed mappings between game inputs, simulated neural activity and controls; the short does not document or validate the mechanism behind each clip.

Could a simulation have experience?

Berman asks whether a hypothetical fully simulated animal or human would be real and whether a fly simulation could suffer. These questions remain unresolved.

Berman asks whether a hypothetical fully simulated fly—and, further in the future, a simulated cat, dog, monkey or person—would be real, and whether such a fly might be suffering. The current wiring map and entertaining animations do not establish a complete simulation or show subjective experience. Whether a particular simulation could be conscious or suffer is an open scientific and philosophical question.