Russia’s War in Ukraine: Drones, Strategy and the Search for Peace

Preston Stewart and Michael Kofman examine battlefield change, political goals and the conditions for a durable settlement.

PSPreston StewartGuestMKMichael KofmanGuest · Senior Fellow
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Lex Fridman
Published
Nov 10, 2026
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2:53:49
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13 min
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SUMMARY

In 30 seconds

In a conversation published November 10, 2026, military analysts Preston Stewart and Michael Kofman discuss the Russia-Ukraine war with Lex Fridman. They examine drone warfare, the 2022 invasion, Bakhmut, command failures, Wagner’s mutiny and the gap between political goals and military means. Their assessments of the battlefield and diplomacy are time-bound and their judgments are attributed to them.

  1. 1Drones change the risks, but do not replace every other capabilityDrones change the risks, but do not replace every other capability
  2. 2Predicting an invasion is different from predicting its coursePredicting an invasion is different from predicting its course
  3. 3Bakhmut’s symbolic and military value are not identicalBakhmut’s symbolic and military value are not identical
  4. 4Bad news can be distorted as it moves up a hierarchyBad news can be distorted as it moves up a hierarchy
  5. 5Negotiation depends on expectations about continued fightingNegotiation depends on expectations about continued fighting
  6. 6A ceasefire needs a credible path to lasting securityA ceasefire needs a credible path to lasting security

Takeaways

  1. Battlefield developments must be evaluated alongside political aims, human costs and the ability to sustain a war.
  2. Drones change visibility and risk, but artillery, organization and human judgment remain important.
  3. Public footage and optimistic reporting can produce a misleading picture of control and progress.
  4. The guests see a gap between negotiating demands and the military means available to achieve them.
  5. A ceasefire may need credible security arrangements to become a lasting peace.
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01

A snapshot of a long war

A snapshot of a long war

In an episode published November 10, 2026, Lex Fridman speaks with Afghanistan veteran Preston Stewart and military analyst Michael Kofman about Russia’s war against Ukraine, the changing battlefield and the difficulty of ending the fighting. Their assessments reflect the time of the conversation, not a live account of the war.

Kofman says assessing the war requires more than measuring changes on a map. The front, the air campaign, the economy, the population and the ability to sustain fighting all shape what either side can achieve.

The guests describe a period in which, in their assessment, Ukrainian forces had improved their position in some areas while Russian strikes continued to impose severe costs. Neither treats a favorable development in one place as proof of a decisive overall outcome.

Kofman distinguishes a state’s objectives from the resources and military performance available to meet them. A government may continue to seek an outcome that its forces cannot achieve on a reasonable timeline.

Stewart sketches the geography of the fighting as it stood during the interview: the heaviest ground fighting was concentrated in the east and southeast, while cities farther from the front also experienced long-range strikes.

Both guests stress uncertainty. Public reporting captures only fragments of a war, and the participants’ own information can be incomplete or distorted. The speakers repeatedly separate what they observe from what they infer.

Kofman says conditions vary along the front and can change over time. He describes areas where Ukraine had regained ground as well as areas of continued Russian pressure, cautioning against a picture of one continuous, fixed line.

Weather also limits some capabilities. Kofman says poor weather can reduce the effectiveness of drones, making other forms of support important rather than obsolete.

02

Drones, adaptation and the limits of footage

Drones, adaptation and the limits of footage

The conversation turns to drones and the danger of moving across exposed ground. Cheap aircraft, sensors and communications can make activity visible over a much wider area than the immediate line of contact.

The guests describe a battlefield shaped by a continuous contest between observation, countermeasures and adaptation. A technique that works for a period can lose its advantage as the other side responds.

Stewart describes the psychological strain of fighting where movement can be watched from above. Equipment changes what soldiers can see, but it does not make the experience any less immediate or frightening.

Stewart says drones have changed the risks faced by infantry and the logistics that support them. Kofman cautions against reducing the war to a single technology: artillery, electronic warfare, ground forces and organization remain important.

The striking videos circulated online are a selective record. The guests warn that footage of successful attacks does not, on its own, reveal the number of attempts, the survival of a target or the balance across a whole front.

They also discuss the human labor behind systems often described as autonomous. Finding and maintaining equipment, interpreting information and deciding what to do still depend heavily on people.

Kofman describes innovation as a cycle rather than a permanent lead. Ukrainian units can be highly inventive, while Russia’s larger industrial base and capacity to copy and scale useful ideas also matter.

The speakers resist treating this war as a universal template. Terrain, air defenses, the forces available and the organization of production all affect whether a lesson would transfer to another conflict.

A visible advance is not the same thing as reliable control. Kofman argues that the space between opposing forces can be contested, and that public maps and brief clips may not capture the uncertainty within it.

The costs to individual soldiers remain central. Technology can make evacuation and resupply harder even as it provides new tools for attempting both. The guests describe these changes as an operational problem and a human tragedy.

The guests describe the unsettling experience of using screens to understand a threat nearby. Fridman notes the contrast between the appearance of a video game and the real human consequences.

Stewart describes the difference between air superiority and air denial: the ability to operate aircraft freely cannot be assumed in every conflict. He says that distinction matters when applying lessons from Ukraine to other militaries.

Stewart asks what the experience means for militaries that have grown accustomed to different conditions. Kofman says it is necessary to examine the assumptions behind each comparison, including the role of air power and the resilience of communications.

Kofman compares the changing role of drones to the emergence of aviation in an earlier era: the question is whether current uses represent a settled form or another stage in a much longer transition.

Innovation alone does not remove the need for training, command and coordination. A promising piece of equipment becomes consequential only when an organization can support and use it at scale.

He notes that the war began with many familiar weapons and forces before drones matured during the fighting. Greater autonomy and changes in the number of people involved remain open questions in his view.

A lesson drawn from a prolonged, relatively static phase may not describe how a future war begins. Kofman asks analysts to specify which phase of a conflict they are studying before generalizing.

To explain the difficulty of scaling complex operations, Kofman compares a small business with a corporation employing thousands. The basic activity may look similar, but coordination becomes much more demanding as the organization grows.

03

Measuring outcomes and revisiting 2022

Measuring outcomes and revisiting 2022

Asked who is winning, the guests push back on a single scoreboard. Their answers depend on the period being examined, the aims each side has set and the price it has paid.

Stewart compares the desire for a simple answer to looking at a sports scoreboard. Unlike teams pursuing the same score, however, Russia and Ukraine have different objectives, and an apparent lead at one moment does not settle the final result.

The guests say abrupt changes are possible in war, while cautioning that possibility is not the same as evidence that either side is about to collapse. Their assessment is limited to the information available during the conversation.

Kofman argues that Russia’s stated ambitions should be compared with its actual military progress. He also says Ukraine’s defense of its independence should be weighed alongside the destruction and displacement it has suffered.

Long wars can change both sides’ expectations. What looked possible at one stage may no longer be achievable, but political leaders do not always revise their demands when conditions change.

Looking back at Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Kofman distinguishes predicting that an invasion was likely from correctly predicting how it would unfold. He says he misjudged elements of the Russian plan and the strength of Ukraine’s response.

Kofman recalls that before the invasion there were competing interpretations of Russia’s buildup. Some observers anticipated a wider attack, while others expected coercion or a more limited conflict.

He says his own analysis did not adequately connect Russian political assumptions with the way the operation might be designed. In his account, those assumptions included an expectation of a rapid takeover and a much weaker Ukrainian response.

A war is an interaction between adversaries, not the execution of one side’s script. Leadership, preparation, mistakes and chance can produce outcomes that neither side anticipated.

Kofman identifies an information imbalance in his profession: analysts often know more about an adversary’s forces and plans than those of a partner. That imbalance can anchor a forecast even when the less understood side has important choices of its own.

The guests discuss why assessments made before fighting starts can break down when assumptions meet reality. They emphasize the importance of revisiting earlier judgments rather than rewriting them after the fact.

He argues against ranking military power in the abstract. Geography, political objectives and the interaction of two forces in a particular scenario can matter more than a universal numerical ranking.

Kofman says analysts can be tempted to assume an adversary can do everything it claims, because underestimating an opponent may have severe consequences. In this case, he says, that caution contributed to an overestimate of Russian performance.

They also consider the role of morale and national resolve. These are difficult to quantify in advance, but the willingness of people and institutions to continue resisting can alter a campaign’s trajectory.

04

Bakhmut and the cost of bad information

Bakhmut and the cost of bad information

The battle of Bakhmut becomes a case study in the gap between a place’s symbolic importance and its military value. The guests describe the immense destruction and losses associated with the prolonged fighting.

Kofman recalls Bakhmut as a battle both inside and around a city. In his account, pressure on the routes supporting its defenders made the position increasingly precarious even before the fighting within the city ended.

Stewart and Kofman examine why each side might continue to commit resources to a city. A position can acquire political significance during a battle, even as commanders must consider whether the forces spent there could serve other objectives.

He recalls a once-livable city being systematically destroyed during a prolonged fight involving infantry, artillery and armor. By the end, he says, the destruction had left very little of the city itself intact.

The debate is not settled by asserting that territory never matters or that holding it is always worthwhile. The relevant questions include the cost, the wider campaign and the alternatives available at the time.

Kofman calls attention to the expectations created by earlier Ukrainian successes. He argues that the long fight over Bakhmut became a focal point that consumed attention and resources at a moment when many hoped the wider war might end sooner.

As in other battles, conflicting reports make it hard to know exactly what happened at any given moment. The speakers warn against confusing a report of movement with durable control or a battle’s strategic result.

Stewart says a location can become politically important because both sides have fought over it for so long. The longer the battle lasts, the more difficult it can become for either leadership to accept withdrawal or failure.

Kofman describes the decision to hold or withdraw as a judgment about changing costs and risks. A defense that once exhausted an attacker can become dangerous to the defenders if they can no longer sustain their positions.

The discussion of bad information turns to institutions. Commanders need subordinates to report failures honestly, but a hierarchy that punishes unwelcome news can instead reward optimistic accounts.

Stewart distinguishes a public claim from effective control. An image of a flag in a town, he argues, does not by itself establish that a force can hold the area or support its people there.

He worries about how inaccurate claims move up the chain of command. The important question, he says, is whether people know a report is false when they pass it on, or whether later decision-makers have come to believe it.

Such distortions can travel upward. Decision-makers who receive an inaccurate picture may issue unrealistic orders, and the pressure to show progress can make later reporting even less trustworthy.

Kofman argues that bad maps can affect military planning and put a force at risk. He and Stewart also acknowledge reporting problems on the Ukrainian side, while judging the incentives and command cultures differently.

The guests do not portray information problems as exclusive to one military. They discuss differences in command culture and the difficulty every organization faces when leaders prefer certainty to inconvenient evidence.

Stewart recalls how pride can make military leaders reluctant to say an assigned task exceeds their resources. In Afghanistan, he argues, soldiers were asked to address social and political problems for which military tools alone were poorly suited.

He says acknowledging that limit would have opened the door to civilian agencies and other expertise. Instead, a determination to make an assignment work can become an overly optimistic assurance.

The conversation reaches Afghanistan and the relationship between political goals and military advice. The speakers question how optimistic assurances can sustain a strategy even when the underlying situation is deteriorating.

Responsibility does not stop at either the military or political level. Leaders have incentives to hear good news, while advisers may present achievable tasks without clearly explaining their limits.

Kofman adds that political leaders can also resist unwelcome advice. A leader may replace an adviser who describes the risks, or seek only enough resources to defer a difficult decision beyond the next election.

The result, he says, cannot be explained only as a failure of military reporting. Domestic politics, international relationships and the assumptions of political leaders also shape what advice is heard and which goals are chosen.

05

Wagner, leadership and political goals

Wagner, leadership and political goals

The guests then revisit Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner’s 2023 mutiny. Kofman interprets it in the context of a worsening conflict between Prigozhin and Russia’s military leadership.

In Kofman’s reading, the move was tied to a struggle over Wagner’s future and the defense establishment’s authority. He treats the participants’ motives as an interpretation, not something outsiders can know completely.

They discuss Wagner’s recruitment of prisoners and the brutal costs of its methods. The group’s subsequent dismantling did not mean every practice or institutional lesson disappeared from Russia’s military effort.

The mutiny also illustrates the risks created when a state relies on powerful formations whose leaders have their own interests. The guests distinguish the public drama from unresolved questions about private decisions and motives.

The discussion of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy returns to the connection between political objectives and military means. Both leaders face choices shaped by their countries’ institutions, resources and populations.

Kofman argues that Russia’s negotiating demands, as he understands them at the time, extend beyond what its forces can secure quickly. He contrasts those demands with Ukraine’s stated interest in a ceasefire and the return of displaced people and children.

He describes potential Russian objectives as involving both territory and constraints on Ukraine’s future security choices. These are his assessments of negotiating positions, not an agreed account from the parties.

For Kofman, a settlement becomes possible when the parties judge negotiation to be preferable to what continued fighting is likely to bring. Stewart agrees that the mismatch between demands and battlefield capabilities is a major obstacle.

The guests also consider manpower and economic endurance. Stewart acknowledges that he expected sanctions and public discontent to have a greater effect on Russia by this stage, and says the political effects of further recruitment are uncertain.

Stewart says manpower is more than a population count: the willingness and ability to recruit, the burden on families and the way soldiers are used all affect how long a force can continue. He says he cannot confidently predict the social response to further recruitment.

Kofman says both countries depend in different ways on external support. He describes Ukraine’s need for sustained financial, military and intelligence assistance, while pointing to foreign economic and military inputs available to Russia.

Ukraine faces a different combination of constraints, Kofman says: fighting on its own territory damages cities and the economy, while external assistance must be renewed over time. Continued defense carries costs even when battlefield results improve.

06

American policy and paths to peace

American policy and paths to peace

Asked about President Trump’s approach, Stewart criticizes what he sees as a loss of American leadership and negotiating leverage. This is his policy judgment, not a neutral finding shared by every participant in the conflict.

Kofman also criticizes the administration’s approach and its consultation with allies. At the same time, he faults the previous US administration and European governments for failing to develop a clear plan for ending the war earlier.

He grants that pressing participants to clarify their requirements can be useful. His concern is that a deal pursued quickly, without a credible account of how it will last, may leave the underlying conflict unresolved.

On paths to peace, Kofman says he is pessimistic about a comprehensive settlement in the near term, while explicitly acknowledging that he could be wrong. He suggests narrower arrangements, such as limits on particular categories of attacks, might be possible first steps.

He stresses that winter strikes affect civilians, infrastructure and the economy, not just soldiers. A country at war is more than the line drawn on a map.

A ceasefire by itself does not guarantee durable peace, Kofman argues. He points to earlier failed agreements and worries that a pause without credible security arrangements could give either side time to prepare for renewed fighting.

His preferred sequence begins with limited measures and demonstrated commitment before a broader agreement. He says a lasting outcome would also have to address Ukraine’s security and the risk of another war.

Looking beyond the current leaders, Kofman expects long-lasting damage to both societies. He argues that Ukraine’s future will depend in part on its relationship with Europe and the support it can secure.

He describes Russia’s trajectory through the lens of an unfinished imperial transition, while rejecting the idea that its present course is inevitable forever. This historical interpretation is his own framing of a contested subject.

07

War and human solidarity

War and human solidarity

Stewart calls war a persistent human failure, even while recognizing acts of courage and solidarity within it. For both guests, individual stories of rescue are a reminder of the people behind abstract military analysis.

They close by describing wounded soldiers rescued through the effort of others, including an account involving uncrewed equipment. The stories do not make the fighting less tragic, but show why the speakers continue to find hope in human care and cooperation.

Their final examples concern wounded people brought to safety and comrades who took risks to help them. Kofman says that humor and care for one another can survive even in a grim setting.

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