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GetYourGuide co-founder and CEO Johannes Reck joins Harry Stebbings to recount the company’s early struggles, venture rounds and pandemic response. He discusses company metrics, founder liquidity, angel investments and European policy from his position as an operator and investor. The financial figures are his recollections and company claims, not independently audited results.
- 1Early pivotReck recalls three to five bookings in two years before the team shifted from student guides to professional experience providers.
- 2Bookings versus revenueHe estimates $2 million net revenue and a 25% take rate before Series A; the host infers around $8 million in bookings.
- 3Refocusing after layoffsReck says the company cut 30% of staff after growing too broadly and credits mentor Kees Koolen with helping it refocus.
- 4SoftBank roundHe recalls roughly $450 million raised in 2019, some of which purchased existing shares rather than funding the company directly.
- 5Travel reboundHe says 2022 volume doubled 2019 levels; the figure is volume, not profit, and has not been independently verified here.
- 6European capital debateReck calls for more growth capital; Stebbings questions whether early-stage European venture needs more funding.
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- Reck says the first student-guide prototype produced only three to five bookings in two years before the team pivoted to professional suppliers.
- He regrets excessive Series A dilution and says the company refocused after broad expansion and layoffs.
- He estimates the 2019 round at $450 million, including secondary sales rather than only company funding.
- He attributes pandemic survival to funding, staff sacrifices, contingency planning and luck, while acknowledging layoffs.
- He favors stronger European growth-stage funding and talent access, positions connected to his business and investments.
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Founding and early experiments
Reck recounts the Beijing trip, student guide prototype and pivot to professional suppliers. He describes family financing and seasonal cash pressure.
Harry Stebbings interviews GetYourGuide co-founder and CEO Johannes Reck about founding a travel experiences marketplace, fundraising, surviving the pandemic and building in Europe. Reck also invests as an angel. His accounts of company performance and policy are founder and investor perspectives, not independently audited results.
Reck recalls a student trip to Beijing in 2007–08. Arriving a day early, he could not find things to do online; the next day his friend and co-founder Tao showed him the city. They returned to Switzerland wanting to help travelers see a place through local knowledge.
Their first version was a peer-to-peer network for student guides. Reck says about 100 students signed up, but the prototype generated only three to five bookings in two years, three from his mother. The founders were still studying and worked on the idea at night, so they could experiment without leaving university.
Stebbings asks whether founders must go all-in when both of them started alongside university. Reck says the next iteration required full-time commitment after graduation: they needed to sign suppliers and build online marketing. He asked his parents to mortgage their home to support him for another year, because he could not obtain seed funding.
Looking back, Reck cannot fully explain his conviction beyond the close founding team and how much he enjoyed working with them. He remembers concentrating on the path ahead rather than dwelling on failure. The decision involved substantial family risk; his experience is not a universal funding prescription.
The team signed suppliers through cold calls and visits. Reck credits an early Vatican tour operator with a breakthrough: once its offer went online, bookings began arriving. Other attractions followed, including the London Eye and Madame Tussauds, as the team moved from student guides toward established experience providers.
He estimates that in 2010 the company generated about $500,000 in net revenue, largely commissions, and was roughly profitable. He distinguishes that from cash: the business was financed by parental mortgages and seasonal winter slowdowns repeatedly threatened survival. These are his recollections, not audited financial statements.
Reck says European venture funding was scarce and investors struggled to categorize a marketplace without a US equivalent. The company moved some staff from Switzerland to Berlin to reduce costs. He credits the Samwer brothers and Rocket Internet with helping establish Berlin's startup ecosystem, though he says he never did business with them.
Venture funding and Series A
He discusses rejection, seed funding and a large Series A. He reflects on dilution and the risks of expanding too broadly.
At a startup conference, Reck approached travel entrepreneur Brent Hoberman, who later met him in London. Reck says Hoberman recognized a missed opportunity from his own career and invested alongside PROfounders. The seed round was roughly $1 million at an estimated $5 million to $6 million pre-money valuation; Reck presents those terms from memory.
Reck says fundraising involved many rejections: the founders were inexperienced, the market was unfamiliar and some US investors wanted the business to relocate. He advises persistence but also using today's mentors and ecosystem to improve a pitch and product. He cautions that fundraising conditions then were different from those now.
Hoberman introduced Reck to US funds, and Alex Finkelstein at Spark Capital led the 2013 Series A. Reck estimates net revenue at about $2 million, growing two to three times year over year; he states a 25% take rate, and Stebbings infers about $8 million in bookings. These figures have different meanings: bookings are not company revenue.
Reck recalls a roughly $14 million Series A at a $30 million to $35 million pre-money valuation. In hindsight he would have raised less because of dilution. He says later founder incentive grants helped, but believes early ownership still needs active management for founders, employees and investors.
Stebbings questions whether founder re-up grants unfairly revise an agreed deal for existing investors. Reck agrees that mistakes cannot simply be undone and says founder incentives should come after a long period, be approved by the board and benchmarked against peers. His first personal package, he recalls, came roughly a decade in; the exchange reflects a debate about allocation, not a universal rule.
The Series A brought visibility and access to new hires, but Reck says it also preceded his biggest mistakes. He describes young founders looking to the board for strategy rather than defending what they saw working with customers. He says the company pursued too many segments and hired senior executives unsuited to its stage.
Refocus and scaling
Reck describes layoffs, mentorship and renewed growth, then explains the Series B and later expansion. His figures are recollections.
Growth slowed as expenses rose, and roughly a year after the round Reck says he laid off 30% of the company and refocused. He recounts an unexpected call from former Booking.com CEO Kees Koolen, who examined the numbers, visited the next morning, joined the board and invested $1 million. Reck credits his mentorship at a pivotal moment.
For a small company still refining product-market fit, Reck says hands-on, entrepreneurial people may be more useful than executives skilled at managing large organizations. At later scale, structure and multi-team management become more important. His point is to hire for the company's actual stage and culture rather than a prestigious résumé alone.
Koolen's lesson, as Reck tells it, was to say no to distractions and keep improving the core product. The team promoted motivated internal employees and refocused on attraction tickets and guided tours in major European cities rather than trying to expand everywhere.
Reck says growth returned to over 100% year over year with better unit economics and the company raised a Series B six to twelve months later. Spark and Highland Europe co-led; he recalls roughly $25 million at a valuation around $90 million to $100 million. These are company recollections, not independently verified metrics.
He says the recovery taught him to bring a clear point of view to the board rather than agree to every suggestion. Highland partner Fergal Mullen's understanding of the product and European ambition helped make the next round straightforward. Reck argues that from Series B onward, investors need traction in the numbers as well as a story.
The company expanded its supply and demand across European markets and made an early move into the US. Reck now thinks the US expansion was premature and that more focus on Europe might have improved growth and profitability, although he says it did establish a foothold. This is a counterfactual assessment, not a measured alternative outcome.
SoftBank and the pandemic
He recalls the 2019 round, the sudden travel shutdown and employee sacrifices. The funding included secondary sales and layoffs occurred during the crisis.
In 2019 GetYourGuide raised a large round involving SoftBank Vision Fund and Temasek. Reck describes a detailed, metrics-oriented diligence process rather than an instant decision. He recalls meeting Masayoshi Son at his home after months of work and discussing both the financials and how AI could shape the product.
Reck estimates the round at roughly $450 million in aggregate and a $1.5 billion to $1.6 billion valuation. Some of that money bought shares from earlier holders, so it was not all primary capital entering the company. He says the funding proved critical when the pandemic began about six months later.
The funding brought attention and flattering treatment, but Reck says the period was brief. When the crisis hit, he learned that many of the people who called during the good times no longer did. His story distinguishes a fundraising valuation and publicity from durable operating performance.
At a February 2020 board meeting, Asian investors urged contingency planning as lockdowns spread. Reck says the founders initially believed they could manage it like previous crises; within three weeks revenue fell to essentially zero and bookings fell from tens of thousands a day to around 15. These are his descriptions of the shock, not independently verified daily data.
Reck compares the shock to a high-speed crash. After initial disbelief, he and the leadership team modeled scenarios and planned for survival and a possible recovery. He says some investors urged immediate company-wide layoffs, but he chose a different plan using the cash on hand and continuing to support suppliers and product development.
He told employees he wanted the company to emerge like a sequoia after fire. Reck says product, engineering and some management staff accepted average salary reductions above 30% in exchange for shares, with some leaders taking cuts up to 80%; other operational staff used short-time work programs where available. Equity value and individual outcomes were uncertain.
Despite those measures, Reck says the company laid off roughly 15% to 20% of staff over two years, while retaining its engineering and product teams. He describes revenue as essentially zero for more than a year, while also noting later domestic booking spikes. The figures are his account and do not establish the experience of every employee.
Europe saw interrupted reopenings, and Reck says US domestic travel supported some demand in 2021. He estimates 2021 remained 50% below 2019, without specifying a precise metric in that comparison. He says the team cut costs and developed contingency plans while the board ultimately supported the chosen strategy.
Recovery, funding and founder liquidity
Reck discusses the rebound, convertible debt and later financing. He distinguishes company funds from his secondary share sale.
Reck says the 2022 rebound was faster than he expected and credits both preparation and luck. Suppliers had moved further online, and the company had worked on product and more direct contracts during the downturn. This is his interpretation of the recovery, not proof of each factor's contribution.
He says activity grew tenfold between late 2021 and March 2022 and that 2022 volumes were twice 2019 levels; he also repeats that 2021 was half of 2019. The tenfold comparison begins from a depressed base, and volume is not profit or net revenue. The interview does not independently verify the measures.
Reck says GetYourGuide also raised roughly $100 million in convertible debt during the pandemic as a reserve. He describes the note as converting in a subsequent equity round at a discount. As travel recovered in 2022, technology fundraising conditions deteriorated, so the next equity raise waited until early 2023.
Asked if founders should always take money when it is offered, Reck says there is no general rule. He thinks early companies can raise too much and dilute unnecessarily, but that a business with traction and significant competition may need capital to move. The challenge is to raise while retaining spending discipline and focus.
Reck believes recognized investors can make later rounds easier, but says the individual partner and their likelihood of staying matter at least as much as the fund's name. Stebbings warns that companies can become orphaned when their sponsor leaves a firm. They discuss price trade-offs as investors and founders, not as a guarantee that a brand improves returns.
Reck says the company raised another round in 2023 and had reached break-even, so it did not use the new capital. He describes the company at the time of interview as profitable and five times its pre-pandemic size, without specifying a comparable metric in that statement. Those are management claims, not audited profit or revenue data.
He says the 2023 round added roughly $100 million after conversion of the earlier debt and was at a higher valuation than the SoftBank round. He prefers to focus on building a good business rather than daily valuation comparisons. Profitability, he argues, can impose useful discipline on experimental spending.
Reck says he sold some secondary shares in 2019, after previously worrying that selling would signal a lack of commitment. He says liquidity gave him calm during the pandemic and recounts offering to repay his parents. This was a sale by an existing shareholder, distinct from capital raised for the company.
He thinks a few million dollars of founder liquidity can be reasonable for a mature company, but cautions against living as though all paper wealth is liquid. Stebbings pushes back that spending can improve health and performance; Reck clarifies that he means avoiding a lifestyle dependent on unrealized wealth. These are personal views, not financial advice.
Angel investing and work culture
He discusses portfolio interests, management styles and sustainable work. His experiences are personal rather than universal rules.
Reck says he has made roughly 30 to 40 angel investments, mentioning TravelPerk and Trade Republic among them. He invests in people and business models he enjoys or wants to learn from. His comments on those companies come from an investor and do not disclose a complete realized return record.
Angel investing changed his view that there is only one way to build a company. He describes Trade Republic's more centralized product leadership and harder-driving culture as different from his own approach. He believes a hospitality business needs a culture suited to its customers and employees; these are his impressions of companies in which he has interests.
Stebbings suggests top founders must work seven days a week. Reck says he and founders he knows worked extremely hard, particularly early on, but does not expect employees to work seven days and no longer does so himself. He argues sustained intensity and time to think are important over a company-building journey measured in decades.
Reck says his role is to gather customer and supplier insight, review numbers and refine strategy; other founders may contribute differently. He says exercise and deliberate time with family help him sustain his energy. The discussion is about his work habits and does not establish a universal number of hours for success.
Europe, talent and quick fire
The speakers debate venture capital and European talent policy. Reck closes with company ambitions and personal priorities.
On Europe and the US, Reck says he has mostly worked with US investors and cannot fully compare the experience. He thinks large prior wins can reduce pressure on US venture funds, while rejecting the idea that European founders are inherently less ambitious. He sees later-stage capital, fragmented markets and experienced talent as constraints.
Reck proposes expanding European venture funding, citing approximate US and European figures and comparing German retirement subsidies with venture investment. Stebbings challenges him, arguing that early-stage European venture already has ample money. Reck accepts there may be enough at seed and Series A, but says larger growth and pre-IPO rounds remain difficult; their figures are not sourced or directly comparable budgets.
Reck calls for attracting skilled people with tax incentives and simpler immigration procedures. He says 90% of GetYourGuide's Berlin employees are not German and recounts a six-month visa process for a senior technology hire. These are company and personal accounts, and his policy proposals align with the needs of his business.
He worries that far-right politics, bureaucracy and weak public services can discourage international talent. He says he donates to several European political parties and supports young politicians, while viewing building a large company as his main contribution for now. These are his political views and disclosed activities.
Stebbings asks whether wealth will concentrate further. Reck thinks European redistribution is comparatively strong and argues the more pressing question is how resources are invested, particularly for younger generations. The interview does not establish a complete comparison of inequality or the effects of his proposed policies.
In quick fire, Reck says he would add Jeff Bezos to the board for his customer and marketplace discipline. He expects GetYourGuide to have more engineers in five years, though fewer than previously planned, and says AI has simplified supplier onboarding and improved pricing and availability tools. These are a prediction and company claims, not measured productivity results.
He says the company wants to expand into tourist-oriented shows and event hospitality rather than core ticketing, which he believes can be a higher-margin market. He identifies Kees Koolen as an important angel and says he has become more aware of his own limitations. His market and margin assessments reflect his commercial position.
Reck says founders balancing work and children should not expect perfection and should find sustainable time for both. He thinks GetYourGuide may be his last job and hopes to be remembered for creating human connection through the company and his work on Europe's future. These are personal priorities and aspirations.
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