Dave Powers on Building Hoka, Reviving UGG and Managing Footwear Brands

Dave Powers tells Harry Stebbings that he had creative interests in music and fashion and started a punk magazine in college, but did not initially imagine a career in them. After working in retail, he learned at Timberland to use the original boot’s qualities as a brand filter: durability, quality and protection should inform even a jacket or backpack.

At Converse, consumer research revealed that people associated the brand with creativity, including writing on their Chuck Taylors. Powers says that understanding shaped the retail experience. He also learned that highly political, siloed workplaces were unhealthy and sought a different environment at Deckers.

He says leaders should model the behavior they want and hire people who can collaborate. In his experience, poor cultural fit often becomes visible through colleagues over six to twelve months. His own hiring errors included overweighting experience or other people’s enthusiasm while ignoring concerns about values.

Stebbings questions whether a relaxed culture sacrifices the determination to win. Powers says Deckers aims for both kindness and competitiveness: people should be able to work as themselves without spending their energy worrying about fitting a prescribed mold. This is his description of the company’s culture.

Deckers acquired Hoka when it was small; Powers says the company wanted a performance brand and initially found the shoe’s appearance unusual. The introduction cites a $1.1 million acquisition and $1.4 billion in 2023 revenue, while Powers later describes the purchase only approximately. These are statements in the episode, not independently verified financial results.

The team put the shoes on ultrarunners and heard positive feedback despite their unconventional appearance. Powers says word of mouth among serious athletes and relationships with specialty running stores built the brand’s initial credibility. His account reflects Deckers’ own commercial perspective.

Early Hoka growth also brought a mistake: chasing a target produced excess discounted inventory. Powers says the company pulled back stock and closed some accounts. He recommends forecasting inventory store by store, estimating sell-through and managing supply by channel so that overdistribution does not force markdowns.

Direct-to-consumer sales have attractive margins for Deckers, Powers says, but require marketing and have limited reach. Wholesale partners create awareness and let customers try shoes, provided they present the brand appropriately. He says Deckers is selective about retail accounts rather than relying only on its own site.

Powers wants retail partners to explain and present Hoka rather than leaving it anonymous on a shelf. The company continues to design and communicate as a performance brand for serious athletes, while welcoming nurses, workers and other people who use the shoes in daily life. He distinguishes expanding access from changing the core brand promise.

For expansion into Japan and other Asian markets, Powers describes starting with athletes and specialist running stores, as Hoka did in the United States. Store staff recommending a shoe to a runner helped generate trial. He says the broad distribution playbook can travel even though individual markets differ.

He wants elite athletes to use Hoka but also values everyday athletes, recalling late finishers at an Ironman event wearing the brand. Powers predicts continued innovation in materials, geometry and performance footwear, including from Chinese brands. His criticism of minimalist shoes as harmful is his opinion in the interview, not established medical evidence.

Powers believes runners historically remained loyal to a shoe brand but are increasingly willing to try alternatives. He describes enthusiastic Hoka customers and compares their attachment to his own affinity for Patagonia; these anecdotes are not a measured lifetime retention rate.

On Running competes for shelf space and customers, but Powers says Hoka should stay true to its own technology and identity. He sees room for both newer brands to gain share from larger incumbents, especially outside the United States. This is a growth opportunity he perceives, not a forecast of achieved market share.

Stebbings cites an approximately $14.6 million purchase price for UGG in 1995. Powers explains that the brand initially served surfers looking for a functional boot after leaving the water. He argues many strong brands begin by solving a meaningful problem for a niche consumer, citing Teva’s origins among river guides as another example.

He says UGG later moved into fashion and cold-weather positioning, reached fashion retailers and celebrities, and received a major boost when Oprah included it among her favorite things. In Powers’ telling, the resulting demand lasted years. The interview does not isolate the effect of any one endorsement.

UGG then lost distinctiveness through overdistribution, Powers says: the same classic boot appeared everywhere, often discounted. He says recovery in the UK and Europe took about five years. Deckers reduced distribution, worked with selected partners and influencers, and tried to reposition and innovate while protecting profitability.

In 2016–17, Powers says Deckers told investors it would slow revenue growth while improving the profit profile. There was significant staff turnover during the reset. He describes asking a new UGG president to change perceptions through materials, color and partnerships, then developing variations that retained elements of the brand’s original identity.

At the time of the interview, Powers says UGG was reducing SKUs, innovating around classics and reaching more occasions. He contrasts historical purchases of a classic boot every two and a half years with customers buying different UGG products two or three times a year. These are his company-level observations, not independently verified cohort statistics.

Hero products such as Timberland’s yellow boot or Converse’s Chuck Taylor create scale, consistency and margin, in Powers’ view. They need careful management and relevant iterations. He admires luxury companies’ ability to maintain aspirational positioning and margins, but says doing so across a brand is difficult.

Powers attributes the decline of some formerly popular mass-market brands to ubiquity and discounting; excess inventory can accelerate the decline. He believes long-established luxury houses have history and a customer base that give them more resilience. These are his interpretations rather than proof that any brand is immune to failure.

Asked why Deckers was not acquiring more brands, Powers says Hoka, UGG and Teva offered substantial organic growth opportunities. He expects the company could add billions in revenue over five years, a forward-looking company view rather than a commitment. He argues acquisitions can be costly and distracting if the buyer overpays.

Powers says Deckers had announced it was looking for a buyer for one smaller brand and was treating investment in Teva like an internal acquisition. Smaller brands can provide learning and employee development, he says. Asked about Strava, he prefers partnership over acquisition because Deckers is not a technology company and integration can be difficult.

He says Deckers shifted resources from spreading money across many brands to concentrating on its largest opportunities. At the interview he cites approximately 18% operating profit margin for Deckers, contrasting it with his estimate of an industry norm around 10–12%. Hoka had the highest initial margin and UGG was close behind, he says; initial margin and company operating margin are different measures.

Full-price direct sales can improve company-level margins by reducing markdowns. Powers cautions that a direct-to-consumer business dependent on heavy marketing may see revenue fall if spending is cut. He mentions marketing spending of 25–30% of revenue as an example, not a universal cost for every direct brand.

Stebbings suggests the distinction may be product quality: good products can generate word of mouth and repeat purchases. Powers agrees that a strong brand can outlast advertising, while a purchase driven only by a fleeting social-media impression may not. Their claims are strategic judgments, not a controlled test of the D2C model.

Stebbings mentions replacing running shoes after roughly 300 miles; Powers discusses repeat purchasing and a possible loyalty program. The mileage figure is presented by the host as a rule of thumb, not personalized medical advice or evidence about a particular shoe’s life. Powers contrasts historical UGG purchase frequency with Hoka purchases and an approximately $160 price point.

Powers says resource allocation is only one part of a CEO’s job alongside motivating teams and maintaining product innovation. He wants employees to identify with Deckers as well as individual brands, but says Deckers does not seek to market the holding-company name to consumers.

His most successful allocation decision, he says, was redirecting money from smaller brands toward the biggest opportunities around 2016–17. A less successful decision was building too much infrastructure in Asia, including a large Hong Kong team and a planned regional website. Deckers later reduced the office and redirected resources.

Keeping talented employees is what worries him most. Stebbings describes frequent small promotions and raises; Powers recalls that career progress at Gap kept him in an environment he did not enjoy. He wants Deckers to offer both a workplace people value and financial opportunity, a description from the company’s leader.

Powers says he grew up with little money and did not expect to become a CEO. He hopes to expose his children to possibilities while letting them choose their own path. Looking back on becoming a parent, he wishes he had paid more attention to his children while balancing career demands and acknowledges that parents’ options differ.

In quick-fire questions, Powers says he would like to examine how to improve Gap and names Nike as the competitor that motivates Hoka internally. He says exercise, music and a beer after work help him unwind; this is a personal account, not health guidance.

Looking ten years ahead from the interview, Powers hopes to keep doing creative and purposeful work. He says Hoka has potential to reach $5 billion in revenue and UGG could eventually double, but gives no timetable for UGG and declines to commit to that outcome. These are aspirations, not forecasts of realized results.