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Studying consciousness makes materialism harder to defend, Alex O’Connor argues, but it does not force an atheist to believe in God. He distinguishes the behavior science measures from the underlying nature of what behaves, and says experience is the one thing we encounter directly. He explores how a universe grounded in consciousness could resemble religious ideas of unity without necessarily implying a creator with human-like agency.
- 1Experience is the instrument of investigationO’Connor compares consciousness to a wrench that cannot use itself to repair its own break. He thinks it differs from the objects investigated through it.
- 2An immaterial mind does not require belief in GodHe says consciousness can be considered fundamental or inexplicable without settling whether God exists.
- 3Knowing how matter behaves does not define its substanceO’Connor uses electrons and chess pieces to distinguish descriptions of behavior from accounts of what a thing intrinsically is.
- 4Conscious experience is encountered directlyAsked how reality’s intrinsic nature could be known, he points to experience as something directly accessible rather than inferred from behavior.
- 5A whirlpool illustrates a mind as part of a larger wholeHe uses an Indian philosophical analogy to explain how an individual might be distinct yet inseparable from a foundational reality.
Conclusiones
- O’Connor distinguishes rejecting materialism from believing in God: an immaterial mind does not require a deity.
- A description of what matter does is not necessarily an account of its intrinsic nature, he argues.
- Scientific observation presupposes experience and, in his account, cannot independently establish all its own starting assumptions.
- O’Connor uses the image of a whirlpool in an ocean to explain one view of individual minds within a shared reality.
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Why consciousness differs from the objects it reveals
O’Connor treats experience as the means of investigation, not simply another object in the world. He distinguishes his objection to materialism from an argument for God.
Chris Williamson asks whether there are other things science will never explain, or whether consciousness is unique. Alex O’Connor thinks it really is different: a table, a chair or a hand is encountered through consciousness. Experience is the means by which we investigate the rest of the world.
O’Connor compares experience to a wrench that can repair everything until the wrench itself breaks: one cannot simply repair it with the same broken tool. Switch off consciousness, he says, and there is no observation, recording of results or reasoning through which to conduct science.
Does that make atheism harder to defend? O’Connor answers that it challenges materialism rather than atheism as such. Someone might consider consciousness fundamental, inexplicable or even illusory without taking a position on God; belief that the mind is immaterial does not itself require belief in a deity.
He asks what a materialist means by saying the universe is made of matter. An atom can be described in terms of protons and electrons, and an electron by its charge and the way it repels another negatively charged particle. But, he asks, what is the nature of the thing doing the repelling?
What behavior tells us about matter
Descriptions of particles and laws do not, in his account, identify the intrinsic substance of reality. He considers the alternative that relations and behavior are all there is.
O’Connor argues that science describes how things behave rather than identifying their intrinsic substance. That is no insult to science, he says: Newton’s laws describe motion, and the rules of chess tell us how pieces move without telling a carpenter what a king is made from.
Perhaps the ultimate nature of reality is simply unknown, O’Connor says; he does not claim that consciousness is the only possible answer. Some thinkers are content to say there is only what things do. He finds that view strange but acknowledges it may be true, and mentions Carlo Rovelli as a defender of a related approach.
To call oneself a materialist, he says, seems to assert something about what reality is made of, yet defining that substance is difficult. If the claim is instead that only what science can describe exists, O’Connor asks how behavior can exist without something that behaves.
Williamson suggests that science has aspired to describe everything. O’Connor replies that a method cannot explain all its own presuppositions: he gives logic, the existence of other minds and an external world as examples he says cannot be established by scientific observation without prior assumptions.
Experience comes before scientific observation
O’Connor says scientific inquiry rests on assumptions it cannot establish from scratch. He points to conscious experience as a direct encounter with reality.
Experience comes first, Williamson observes; science is conducted through it. O’Connor says some philosophers see no underlying substance at all, invoking the Buddhist idea of emptiness. He personally thinks there is something real underlying the world and asks how its nature might be known.
A critic could ask how language could explain an irreducible substance without merely talking around it. O’Connor answers that conscious experience is the one thing directly encountered: one knows what experience is without having to infer it from an external description.
Religious unity and the whirlpool in the ocean
The speakers consider whether fundamental consciousness resembles God. O’Connor relates a sense of unity to Indian traditions and Spinoza’s account of God or nature.
Williamson asks how a fundamentally experiential universe differs from God. He connects that question to religious experiences and asks how such experiences can be assessed if experience itself is outside the kind of scientific explanation O’Connor has described.
O’Connor says mystical traditions often describe not a conversation with a separate being but a feeling of unity with divinity. On a view that identifies God with a foundational consciousness, an individual could be an expression of that consciousness.
He describes Brahman in Indian traditions as ultimate reality, rather than necessarily a creator acting like a person. A whirlpool is a distinct pattern in an ocean, yet cannot be lifted out of it: the analogy presents an individual as one expression of a larger reality.
For idealists and panpsychists who regard consciousness as fundamental, O’Connor says, a religious or psychedelic sense of being one with nature can be interpreted as recognition of a common basis. Leaves on the same tree can be distinct while belonging to one organism.
O’Connor turns to Spinoza. Rather than merely bringing God down to the level of nature, he says, Spinoza raised nature to the level of divinity: one ultimate substance, called God or nature, in which everything exists.
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