Oren Zeev on Deployment Pace, Ownership and Investing Independently

Oren Zeev describes starting as an engineer and researcher before entering venture capital in Israel in the 1990s. He spent 12 years at Apax, moved to Silicon Valley and later began investing independently. He says the independent model let him make decisions in his own way.

In 2022 he distinguishes the current market correction from the dot-com crash and 2008. He recalls the dot-com period as damaging both valuations and underlying technology businesses, while he sees many of his own portfolio companies still experiencing demand in 2022. This is his dated assessment, not a current market conclusion.

He says every crisis is different and offers no single template. He recalls that all the deals he made in 1999 failed, then cites Audible as a subsequent success. His advice is to learn, help founders where possible and avoid becoming so absorbed in past mistakes that future opportunities are missed.

Zeev says he raised three funds totaling about $1 billion in 2021 and was raising another $500 million at the time of the interview. He does not set a fixed deployment pace: he wants to invest when he sees opportunities and avoid making a deal merely because time has passed. These are his historical fundraising statements, not realized returns.

He disputes the need to spread each individual fund’s investments evenly across vintages. Stebbings notes that limited partners have budgets and allocation constraints, so rapid successive funds can disrupt their plans. Zeev says an investor seeking vintage exposure could participate across funds; this is his approach and may not fit every limited partner.

He says market conditions may slow his pace without changing his decision process. In his account, roughly 80% of his deployed capital went to follow-ons and 20% to new investments, and companies that raised substantial cash in 2021 were returning to market less quickly. The proportions describe his approach at the interview, not a universal allocation.

He evaluates a follow-on on its own merits, like a new investment. If he has strong conviction that a company can sustain rapid growth, he would rather risk paying somewhat more than miss an opportunity. His growth and valuation examples are hypothetical, and growth is not guaranteed.

When he loses faith in a business, Zeev says he tries to tell the founder candidly and without blame. He distinguishes doubts about the business from doubts about the entrepreneur, and notes that a founder’s time is also an investment. In one example, the team was exploring a sale after failing to raise on the expected terms.

He argues that recognizing a business will not continue while there is still time and cash can allow an orderly process and support employees. His comments are a personal management judgment about difficult closures, not a rule that every struggling company should shut down.

Zeev rejects an inflexible ownership target. He says the relevant question is whether a successful outcome could materially affect the fund, even with a small stake. He gives an example of an investment where his ownership diluted and he still expected a valuable outcome; that expectation is a forecast, not an achieved exit.

He criticizes rigid thresholds that make a small difference in ownership decisive only because a partnership has an internal rule. In his view such incentives can affect which opportunities a partner chooses to pursue. He contrasts that with his own ability to decide without partners, an advantage he claims for his business model.

Zeev argues that a partner may favor deals easier to approve rather than the most contrarian ideas, because a controversial proposal requires persuading colleagues. He acknowledges the comparison comes from his own experience at Apax and as an independent investor. It is his view, not evidence that all partnerships behave alike.

He also questions automatic pro-rata investing. If a new round is attractive, he asks why an investor should not try to increase ownership; if it is unattractive, why invest merely to preserve a prior percentage? Stebbings favors an all-in-or-out approach, while Zeev adds that supporting the company can make the decision less binary.

On diversification, Zeev agrees that the number of companies needed depends on the probability of success of each investment. His examples of 50% and 10% success probabilities are hypothetical. He argues that some limited partners over-diversify across funds, but this is his opinion and does not establish an appropriate allocation for others.

The hosts criticize incentives that may favor access to prestigious fund brands over returns. Zeev particularly points to funds of funds and then argues that some limited-partner processes are slow because investors face little penalty for delay. These are their broad impressions, not verified descriptions of all limited partners.

Asked about signaling risk when an existing investor does not follow on, Zeev says it exists and should be considered. He says he aims to be truthful and avoid harming the company. The interview does not establish that any particular follow-on decision is free of signaling effects.

To increase ownership, he says he may offer to lead a round before a broad process when founders prefer it, or step in after other investors show less interest. He says he does not want founders to use other investors merely to set a price. He cites Riverside and Tipalti as examples of companies he backed, with a direct financial interest.

He recognizes that sometimes a weak market response may be correct, rather than an opportunity he understands better. He believes independent decision-making makes it easier for him to act on conviction than it would be for a partner who must persuade a committee. That comparison is his interpretation of incentives.

Asked about secondary sales, he jokes that the shares he might want to sell are often hard to sell, while unsolicited offers arrive for shares he wants to keep. This is a personal observation about liquidity, not a guarantee that desirable investments can be sold.

Zeev recalls a potential Facebook investment at Apax that did not advance because partners were not interested, while acknowledging he cannot know whether he would ultimately have secured it. He also recounts an unrealized plan to take Audible private after a share-price correction.

He speculates that Audible might be worth $50 billion to $100 billion if assessed in 2022 and that a different transaction might have produced a larger outcome. He acknowledges Amazon’s ownership may have helped and cannot establish the counterfactual. The estimate is his hypothetical valuation, not a market price or realized return.

He says those experiences contributed to his decision to invest independently, while admitting his own errors. With dLocal, he made a personal investment but did not invest as much through his fund because he feared an early sale would limit the upside. He says that proved a mistake in his own decision process.

Zeev says his personal dLocal investment produced more than 100 times his money and refers to different company market capitalizations at different moments. The interview does not establish the extent or timing of realized proceeds, and those historical valuations should not be read as current. His financial interest is direct.

The lesson he draws is that a relatively quick two- or three-times return could have been reinvested rather than treated only as a drag on a fund’s average. He distinguishes a decision he believes he could have reasoned through at the time from a missed opportunity visible only with hindsight.

His advice to newer managers is to make themselves a compelling partner for founders. He says he learned at Apax that unnecessary tension with founders can be counterproductive. This is his emphasis on attracting deals and supporting companies, not a denial of duties to limited partners.

In the quick-fire round, he mentions enjoying Bad Blood and describes changing his mind about a struggling portfolio company after seeing new signs of progress. He says he offered $4 million rather than merely contributing to a smaller bridge, hoping to give the business a chance to pursue growth. His optimism is not an outcome.

He reiterates that founders are the immediate customer in his approach and says better relationships can help win opportunities and ultimately attract capital. He also appreciates different strengths among other investors, mentioning lessons from Ben Horowitz’s writing on operations.

Zeev says he remembers first meetings with Audible and Houzz partly because they led to strong outcomes. He recalls deciding quickly, while noting that at Apax he still needed partnership approval. Such recollections are subject to hindsight and do not establish that fast decisions work generally.

Asked about insecurity, he says his years of experience have given him confidence in his overall decision-making and partnership with founders, despite not being the deepest expert in every domain. He admits the possibility of missing an exceptional company can still bother him.

He recalls first seeing Riverside in 2020 as a basic, buggy product with high churn, but says five to ten people a day were signing up and paying about $40 a month without formal marketing or sales. These are his historical observations, not independently verified retention or current revenue figures.

He later led a Riverside round that the founders preferred, and says he expects a much larger outcome. That is his forecast as an investor, not an established return. His lesson is to look for a real customer problem even when the initial solution is imperfect.