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In this June 2026 video, Theo argues that restrictions around Anthropic's Fable model limit who can use it and complicate evaluation. He cites benchmark results that use an Opus fallback and a report of refusals on ProgramBench, and criticizes the precedent he believes the restrictions set.
- 1A powerful model with access limitsTheo praises Fable's capabilities but criticizes how Anthropic implemented access restrictions.
- 2Benchmark fallback mattersHe notes that strong reported results can include an Opus 4.8 fallback rather than Fable alone.
- 3ProgramBench refusalsHe cites a reported run in which Fable refused all 200 tasks, and argues that restrictions affect evaluation.
Das Wichtigste
- Theo says some people could not access Fable at the time of the video.
- Some benchmark results for Fable included an Opus 4.8 fallback.
- Theo cites a report that Fable refused all 200 tasks in a ProgramBench run.
- He argues that the restrictions set a troubling precedent for future models.
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Access and benchmark restrictions
Theo criticizes the limits on who can use Fable. He also examines benchmark results and the role of a fallback model.
Fable, Anthropic's new Mythos-class model, is powerful, but at the time of this video some people cannot use it at all. I think the way Anthropic implemented these restrictions is unacceptable.
The model has benchmarked very well, but some results come with a qualification: an Opus 4.8 fallback. In another example, a reported ProgramBench run says Fable refused all 200 tasks. I find the restrictions absurd, and I worry about the precedent they set.
Refusals and precedent
He cites reported refusals on ProgramBench. He worries about the precedent set by such restrictions.
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